



*BHONSALA RESEARCH CENTRE
FOR CONFLICT AND PEACE*

DAKSH

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ABOUT B.R.C.C.P.

Central Hindu Military Education Society, Nashik, founded in 1937, by the late Dharamveer Dr. B.S.Moonje, is a pioneer institution in the field of Military Education. To promote the ideals of Dr. B.S.Moonje, the society runs various institutions in a single 160 acre campus having classes from K.G. to P.G. covering besides academies, various aspects of personality development and physical training.

Bhonsala Military College, a regular college affiliated to the Pune University, is one of the few institutions in the country conducting courses in Defence and Strategic studies upto the post graduation level. As an extension to post graduate department, a research centre has also been opened under the banner, "Bhonsala Research Centre for Conflict and Peace".

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The main objective of this centre is to promote consciousness about National Security and identify solutions to conflicting issues at National and International level.

Activities :

The centre conducts various activities such as
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In addition, a half-yearly Publication called "DAKSH" will be a regular feature covering the search articles on wide range of issues on National, Regional and International security and other areas.

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regards and thanks,
[Signature]



Dedicated to the fond memory of
Late Dharamveer Dr. B. S. Moonje
founder of
Central Hindu Military Education
Society, Nashik



ABOUT DAKSH

Daksh is half-yearly publication of Bhonsala Research Centre for conflict and peace. It is the extension of other academic activities taken up by the post-graduate department of Bhonsala Military College based on the ideal concept of the late Dharamveer Dr. B. S. Moonje, founder of the Central Hindu Military Education Society, who started primarily with the idea of the need for indianisation of the Army during his days i.e. in the middle of 1930.

As a part and parcel to translate into practice the noble ideas of Dr. B. S. Moonje in the light of contemporary security environment in larger perspective, Daksh aims at projecting and analysing issues related to security and other spheres in the national, regional and global arena and evaluate them through inter-disciplinary angle.

Each issue would feature idea, perception and thought from the scholars of various back ground on problems-past and present.

FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Two double-spaced typed or xeroxed copies of article / paper within the limit of 2000 words can be sent with proper reference / foot notes at the end of the article / paper with a brief personal bio-data to the Principal, Bhonsala Military college, Nashik - 422 005. Reproduction of article / paper in any form for other publication can be made with prior permission from the Principal, Bhonsala Military College Nashik - 5. The ideas, views and perception expressed in the journal are entirely of the contributor.

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EXECUTIVE EDITOR'S NOTE

- Dr. L. Randeep Singh

The fragile nature of international political scene and its impact on the power dynamics and the resultant implications on the regional and sub-regional levels are indicators to the developing nation like India to re-evaluate and analyse all issues from both domestic and external parameters in a wider context.

And thus, the phrase National Security is no more a water-tight compartment. The meaning of national security lies with the overall strength of the combination of various elements that are there in enhancing national power.

And a co-ordinated projection of all those elements in a proper direction needs in-depth-vision and systematic managerial skill through the mills of various diversified sectors.

In this issue, we are projecting a combination of six articles namely, Changing Trends of Threat Perception and Internal Security Problems of India, Terrorism and Insurgency, Uttarakhand : Creation and Repurcussions, Apropos of CTBT, Indian Nuclear Policy - Retrospect and Prospect and SAARC, SAPTA and Politics of Economic Integration in South Asia.

The articles represent the cross currents of view points on the problems and issues on domestic, regional and international parameters.

In this issue, we have concluded with an article on regional co-operation namely SAARC, SAPTA and Politics of Economic Integration in South Asia with a silent view that all the developing nations will progress mutually with regional co-operation in this international political game.



CHANGING TRENDS OF THREAT PERCEPTION AND INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS OF INDIA.

Dr. Rajvir Singh

The last few decades have brought into sharp focus an alarming and at times disastrous process in the relationship between man and man, society and among communities and countries. Since these different problems manifest themselves differently in different parts of the world, their solutions are bound to be different. In India, these processes of relationship and problems are closely linked to our national security and integrity. Firstly, India is an ancient country with wide and varied civilisations and cultures. In India, we find a variety of races, religions, castes, creeds and colours. In such a vast and diverse society, the public opinion can easily be motivated by injecting different fears in the minds of the people by people trading on communal, caste and regional sentiments. Moreover, the security of the country is threatened by internal disturbances. Secondly, India has been widely regarded as being among the few newly independent and developing countries where people's behavior is passing through a transitional period under different Socio-political and eco-ethnic compulsions and thrust of modernization is continuously increasing with age old traditions which contains in itself different problems of the present time. In view of the changing trends of these multidimensional and deep-rooted security problems of the country their solutions are to be different. Such continuous evolutionary threat of problems and the current, prevailing internal security situation in India calls for wide-spectrum subjective study, research and a comprehensive review of the internal security environments of the country.

Concept of national Security :- Security perception is indivisible, it can not be compartmentalised for the purpose of the perceptive analysis. At the national level security has to be seen as an integrated emergence of national policy and strategy, which means identifying and safeguarding India's vital interest. It also means having institutions which are responsible for evolution and operation of the national policy and analysis each aspect of national problems which may have a bearing on evaluation of threat to overcome or neutralize the visualised threats.

National security has two aspects : External security and internal security. External security encompasses the global security environment, the posture of the big and super powers, the security threats from neighbours, their military potential and spelling out their possible aims under various contingencies, including, suppressions. Internal security means stability, viability and permanence of the state itself as an international personality, which is to be defended against violent, anarchial or disorderly forces which threatens its very existence directly from within

or by weakening its poles and making it an easy prey to external aggression or domination.

National security issues govern international relations and internal security. Internal security issues govern the stability of nation. Thus external security of a state is closely interlinked with internal security. A stable nation can grow economically, build up national power, enjoy a degree of respect in the international forum. Thus, it is able to have an effective and beneficial foreign policy for safe guarding its specific, dynamic, permanent, even universal goals and so called national interests, realistic as well as idealistic. Both statesmen and academicians are agreed on this point that national interests, national values and national objectives are the basic goals of the foreign policy and national security. Therefore, security encompasses all aspects of human activities and the whole gamut of a governmental control. In practice, security is an architectural governmental phenomenon whose intensity is in the passion of the people who determine the real strength and true might inevitable for preserving existence of a nation.

Trends and Issues :- India has a rich cultural heritage characterised by tolerance, compassion and synthesis. After independence our country opted secularism and equal opportunity for all. But vested interest and divisive forces under the cover of caste communal organisations, criminal groups and political syndicates have been encouraging fissiparous tendencies to under mine the security, unity and integrity of India. As we approach the end of twentieth century and before we enter the millinium, we have to urgently deal with two challenges of this century that are still with us. Firstly, the internal challenge of mass poverty, unemployment, sectarianism and digression. Secondly, external challenge to require a posture of globalisation and self reliance. But country is also facing number of other challenges. Since the end of cold war and disintegration of Soviet Union, coincide with a social, political and economic instability in India and number of divisive forces are working together to break us in fragments, it has been the weakness of the Indian political system and political parties, which are adopting myopic policies for their parochial gains and providing more ammunition for criminalisation and communalisation of politics. It is with the help of crime political Nexus hard core criminals, crime syndicates Mafia groups and politicians have established macro terrorism network and have developed its crucial business links. These syndicates have acquired substantial, financial and muscle power, social respectability and have been successfully controlling the government machinery. Thus the self seeking and corrupt politicians, criminal gangs, armed sena's, Drugs Mafia's, smuggling gangs, drugs peddlers, economic lobbies and governmental functionaries are working together and have succeeded in creating a Jungle Raj and India reveals itself as a functional anarchy.

As US based economist Mr. Webaian Frugal has interrupted the current eco-political system of India is a "Sleazy, semi criminalised, suitcase capitalism."

The politicians in India has no credibility with the people; they are corrupt to the core. Even the bureaucrats in India have joined hand with corrupt politicians for the sake of power privilege, patronage and illgotten money. Thus political functionaries have given a sort of legacy to the corruption, first tolerated and then systematically promoted upto the parliament label. Indian Political culture has cultivated an indulgent attitude towards corruption. It is not surprising that India has seen more economic, scandals, securities scam, sugar scandal, telecom scam, Hawala scam, Fodder scam, housing scam and so on. The present political system of India has reduced India to such a low state that one wonders if it will be able to survive as a nation. Because, youth of India is not willing to accept the political rubbish of the corrupt system, that is why they are indulging in anti-national activities.

Most of the problems with which we are facing are due to failure of national policies, lack of accountability and weak intelligence infrastructure. The analysis of circumstances leading to terrorist activities in Punjab and insurgencies in J & K blame squarely on Congress I Government of the centre. In Punjab Bhindrenawale was created as a means to nullify the political strength of the Akali Dal by the Congress High Command. Later on, guntoting Bhindrenwale and his armed Sikhs had been allowed to develop into a force to reckon with by the Sheer importance of the Punjab Police and Civil Administration and complete ineptitude of the Centre to act when action was required. In Kashmir, Indira Gandhi was deeply involved in getting the Congress I to rule the state even at the cost of destabilising a border state. Pak has got range full opportunities in both the states and has given every possible help to the insurgent group and has succeeded in its strategy of sabotage by nursing the secessionist activities in India.

The brief analysis of the current scenario of the country reveals that the Indian political system is on the verge of collapse. Due to the impact of recent happenings, such as wide spread insurgency in Kashmir, violence in the North-east states sustained by various extremist groups, Arms dropping incident deep inside our territory, the narcotics and illegal arms trading flourishing across our border areas, the Hawala scandal has highlighted the vast injection of money from abroad to harbor terrorist activities in the country as well as to buy protection from politicians; the politicians, bureaucracy, under world nexus has grown and it is making our border porous, our air space and coast line vulnerable to penetration and fomenting terrorism and secessionism. Moreover, corrupt politicians and administrative machinery constitute the most potent threats to the nation.

Viewed in this perspective, we have seen the fate of Soviet Union

and Yugoslavia. We are still around, perhaps, precisely because we have struggled to remain a "democracy" in which the pressures of diversity can let off steam. But there is no guarantee that our experiment will succeed merely because of 19th Century myth making told us that out of nationalist necessity that India was and is forever. Now time has come for us to adopt a fresh outlook with political accountability towards our national security, create defence and security awareness amongst the people and develop an integrated approach and strategy to face the threats & challenges of the present time.



TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

Dr. L. Randeep Singh

The spectre of political violence and terrorism has come to acquire a grave signification. In recent years, it has become a popular subject for research and enquiry. There seems to be a difference in the opinion with regard to interpretation of the term terrorism by people belonging to the developed nations as against those from the developing countries. While the former view perpetrators of political violence and terrorism as pathological individuals driven by irrationality and insanity, some of the latter see them as revolutionaries dedicated to achieve national liberation.(1)

The assessment of the historical relevance of a terror system i.e. in evaluating whether it was necessary or detrimental to the achievement of political aims and whether it has contributed to a progressive historical development by helping to humanise the human condition, may be dependent on the political standpoint of the assessor.

However, more recently, it has been reflected that terrorism and insurgency are of the same brand. But still there are two schools of thought :-

- 1) One claiming that insurgency is altogether different from terrorism or revolutionary movements.
- 2) The other believing that terrorism and insurgency have become co-terminous terms.

Perhaps a review of existing literature on terrorism and insurgency will indicate the extent of the parameters of the two as well as the difference between the two. Various authors and observers have put opinions in different ways. (2)

The US Department of Defence defines terrorism as the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies; often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. The US Army on the other hand, defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals-political, religious or ideological in nature.

Thomas perry Thornton(3) categorised two types of terrorism. The first is "roughly, the activity of insurgents who wish to disturb the existing order and achieve power" The second is "the activity of the incumbents who wish to suppress that challenge to their authority".

Although they might differ in content, they exhibit a striking similarity. There is no denying that this is a game of power struggle.

In a multi-racial society, where separatism or national liberation is at stake, this might involve an attempt to polarise racial or ethnic groups. Similarly, in an urban setting, communal groups exist in close proximity to society. Minority groups direct indiscriminate violence against the

dominant groups, an action which incites retaliation. Increasing polarisation of conflict encourages more recruits to the minority groups. This strategy was employed with some success in Algiers by the ALN but with a notable lack of success by the PLO in montreal.(4)

Violence and terroristic acts are typically undertaken by specialist conspiratorial and para military organs within the revolutionary movement(5). Being a group phenomenon, it has an ethos, an ideology and programme to achieve its ends. Most terrorist actions in the 1960s were carried out by clandestine political groups. The percentage of identification is more clearly defined with reverence of European States than in others, with regard to the most responsible group identified with such acts. Legitimate organisations quite often provide the context and cover for violent action for some segment of its numbers.

Emphasising upon the other aims of the insurgent Roger Perkinson(6) says that "another aim or need for insurgents is the acquisition of as much as wide an appeal as possible in order to gain maximum support from the population:with this, the insurgents have the advantage of being able to promise more than they actually intend to give".

Marx and Engles (7) have their own view as they declare that "First; never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequence of your actions. Its value and magnitude may change everyday; the forces opposed to you have all the advantage of organisation, discipline and habitual authority; unless you bring strong odds against them, you are defeated and ruined. Secondly, insurgency once entered into must act with great determination and be on the offensive. Being on the defensive could lead to defeat even before it has measured itself with its enemies.

As V.K.Anand (8) has pointed out, "In this age of sophisticated techniques, insurgency has acquired a modern approach yet in another sense. It can be regarded as the same old guerrilla warfare in the struggle between man and man.

Not ignoring the influence and advantage of the technologically advance world upon the approach and activities of the insurgents of the day, the observer signifies that the inner core of such a game called insurgency is still not changed as the same guerrilla oriented man to man fighting is still there.

According to Captain Steven E. Daskal(9) "Insurgents are motivated by a variety of actors, but probably the strongest is idealism..... true believers. They aim to eliminate the system that seeks to eliminate their very own system".

This professional observer says that even though there are variety of factors for the origin of an insurgency, the strongest factor is idealism. It emphasises about the degree of conviction by a group for a cause. And it also shows the responsibility and the size of the goal by indicating that it is not merely an expression of a group protest but it has to destroy an

existing system with a hope to replace the system by another one.

In the light of contemporary historical trend, success for the insurgents may be determined by two qualifying factors; (a) popular support and (b) support from foreign governments. To obtain the first, they must make their presence felt. For the second, neighbouring hostile states offer the opportunities in order to create political problems in peripheral for the established authority.

Terrorism has started to act as a definite weapon in the hands of insurgents. Yet its advantages and limitations must be evaluated in a proper perspective. It could lead to the effective use of terror to achieve one's ends. Foremost among its advantages is the economy of effort required. In quasimathematical terms this would mean : less input = enhanced output. Thomas Perry Thornton(10) states that "Since terror is a weapon having political implications, it should be considered in the light of its relationship to the entire spectrum of political agitation.(11)

Here, it will be interesting to note what Lawrence Freedman has said. He has pointed out that "as a strategy, terrorism must be purposive." The purposes are not always easy to discern because of the nature of the terrorism and terrorist but it must be distinguished from pathological violence. So for example, the assassin of the political leader may have severe personality disorder, a grudge against the leader as an individual, a fantasy about acquiring a place in the history books, or a belief that as a result of this assassination important political changes will take place. As he assessed, "The weakness of both the international community and particular states in responding to terrorism also contributed to its increase." But since 1972, certain West European states have begun to take a firmer line; and there has been a widespread growth of elite units of special forces designed for hostage rescue, a development inspired by the success of the Entebbe (1976) and Mogadishu (1977) rescues.

The observer (12) further expressed that "the shift of revolutionary theory in the Third World away from the rural guerrilla concept towards the idea of urban struggle is an important feature of contemporary terrorism. European revolutionaries in the 19th century and early 20th century had been through a similar process. The hunger for publicity - the propaganda to shoot a couple of businessmen in the middle of Algeria than to shoot a hundred or so soldiers in a lonely gully".

Coror Crese O'briand (13) has different view. He does not intend to mix up terrorism with insurgency. He argues that "the force used by a democratic state against terrorists is legitimate and terrorist groups claim to be liberation movements are attempts to inject terrorist groups with legitimacy that most contemporary terrorist movements lack".

On the other hand, Laquer (14) argues that the definition of the word terrorism has been greatly changed over the last century. For him, "Terrorism is now an insurrectional strategy that can be used by people of different political convictions".

Another observer (15) has a broader outlook on the issue. He projects that terrorism has become a key of a systematic activity. Its frame has now been enlarged. As he describes it "The factor of dependence upon weaponry, combined with the reliance of many terrorist movements and agencies upon a military organisational structure and style underline the close relationship between terrorism and war. Indeed many American and French scholars have been so impressed by this affinity that they have tended to study terror exclusively in the context of 'internal war' and 'problem of counter insurgency'".

Jeckins takes (16) "terrorism as a kind of threat of violence designed primarily to instil fear". He feels that terrorism is aimed at people and fear is the intended effect. Thus Jeckins isolates terrorism as violence against the people without much political significance.

Regis Debrary (17) also has an independent stand. He is against taking terrorism as related to revolutionary or insurgency movements. As he says, "Terrorism is to be taken as individual action. It is not related to the development and objectives of a revolutionary movement, it is independent of the historical and subjective aspirations of the masses". The observer wants to imply that terrorism does not have the implication for a mass movement. It is violence for individual gains.

But Paul Wilkinson (18) (with reference to terrorism's global links) takes terrorism as a weapon for revolutionary warfare. His opinion is that "terrorism has become one of the most ubiquitous and typical weapons in the most characteristic form of warfare in the modern world revolutionary warfare".

Quite reverse to the above idea, Benjamin Netanyahu (19) feels that "terrorism blurs the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, thus braks the central tenet of the law of war. The writer observe that only does the terrorist break down this standars, but also that people begin to accept this standard.

A noted scholar of International Law (20) is of the opinion that "insurgency is a war of citizens against the state for the preposes of obtaining power in whole or part." It always implies a sustained armed struggle by a group of citizens (big or small) resort to violence against and established order for the purposes of even partial political demand can be termed as insurgents. Hence, the logic of defining terrorism with the size of the demand is not a vaild argument as terrorism is being practiced by a group of people for a certain kind of demand, and in the modern days, political demands, for the group itself or in support of the demands of other group or groups.

It is not surprising that the function of terror was visible in the French Revolution. Terror with reference to a specific ideology developed in a historical process serves as a justification for terror and can link up with existing impulses to social change-as well as with religious and racial hatred. The ideology of the French Revolution aimed in particular at

achieving a moral effect : psychological trauma i.e terror, was supposed to evoke civic virtue. "La Terreur" is the name to the period the French Revolution during which the Revolutionary tribunal under Danton and later Robespierre held sway (from the spring of 1793 until July 27,1794.)

Kari Marx (21) interpreted the phase of show-trials in the French Revolution as an application of a proletarian sense of power. He saw at work in this procedure the driving force of the revolution rather than its stagnation or loss of moral credit.

From the above review, it can be assessed that there is no assurance that terrorist acts would not become a part of insurgency activity and an insurgency, on the other hand, become terrorist activity. Both are reversible to each other as there is no clear dividing line between them.

Notes

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UTTARAKHAND : CREATION AND REPURCUSSIONS

Dr. Lakshmi Kumar and Dr. Govind Das

The announcement of the grant of statehood to the region of Uttarakhand has once again sparked off the nationwide debate for creation of smaller and viable states within the Indian Union. The other demands, lying dormant till now for granting statehood to the other regions of India like Vidarb, Telangana, Jharkhand, Gorkhaland, Bodoland, Bundelkhand etc. have rejuvenated and are being hotly debated countrywide. Nevertheless, the demand for the creation of the state of Uttarakhand is manifestly different from the other demands of statehood, particularly in one respect that two popular Governments have unanimously passed resolution in the Assembly for creation of the separate State and submitted the same to the Central Govt. for its formal approval.

The main plank of the movement is summarily based on two ideological footings viz :

1. The separate State of Uttarakhand be formed for the reasons that;
 - a) The vast area of UP has become unmanagable. Division of the State and structural reorganisation of Uttarakhand would enable this region to fully exploit its untapped potential towards Self-reliance.
 - b) All the policy formulation are done from the distant capital by the representatives of the people/bureaucrats, grossly ignorants of the ground realities of the region, resultantly the developmental schemes remain confined to the files or else, the benefit does not reach to its beneficiaries.
 - c) The economic backwardness, resulting from the lack of basic infrastructural facilities has obliged the youth to seek employment down the hills which has emptied the villages from the youth/males. Such a phenomenon has not only shattered the very Social Fabric of the region but also has made the families insecure.
 - d) The discontent among the youth also emanate from the "failure" of the Govt. to substantially promote and fund the research/means to exploit the natural to enable it to become a self-reliant one.
- 2) The 27% reservation meant for the OBCs must not be forced upon for the Uttarakhand for the reason that;
 - a) The population of the OBCs in the Uttarakhand is meagre 2% as such the reservation of 27% to a population of just 2% would forfeit the opportunities of others in admission and employment.

3. The Officers/employees, hailing from the plains are said to have been posted on "posting, promotion and punishment" and since they fail to develop the emotional attachment, irrespective of their length of stay, they "fail" to deliver their best to the region. The employment of the deserving, disciplined and devoted officers/employees to the Administrative posts would pave the way for the speedy development of the region.

GENESIS :

This region has a distinct Socio-Cultural identity and significance. Demand for creation of the separate state, for the first time, was raised on Second Round Table Conference and subsequently was put before Cabinet Mission as well. This demand was further put before the State Reorganisation Committee in 1950. Sardar K. M. Pannikar, the revered member of the Commission concurred to the proposal, however the other two members disagreed to the proposal on the grounds that the development of this region would commensurate more effectively within the State of Uttar Pradesh. In 1952, leader of Communist Party of India, Sri P. C. Joshi raised demand for granting autonomy to the Hill areas. Further, in 1955 Fazal Ali Commission also considered reorganisation of UP with a view to make the Uttarakhand a separate State out of it, however, no definite action was taken by the Commission in this regard. Since then on different occasions, the idea for creation of new state comprising hill districts of Uttar Pradesh was mooted through different fora at different point of time.1

In 1992, an expert Committee of the Planning Commission submitted in its report that due to acute unemployment in the hill districts of UP, the exodus of the youth continues unabated and the Commission suggested that with a view to tackle this issue, this region, like other Himalayan States, too must be accorded priority and be fully equipped. Earlier, the BJP Govt. agreeing in the principle for the creation of the State of Uttarakhand, passed the resolution to this effect on Aug 12, 1991 and submitted the same for necessary approval of the Central Govt. Later on, the SP-BSP Govt. on the basis of the recommendations of the Kaushik Committee, passed an unanimous resolution on Aug 24, 1994 for separate State of Uttarakhand and submitted the same to the Central Govt.

SIMMERING ISSUES :

- 1) The issue of the reservation which ignited the Uttarakhand movement was just one of the other problems, this region has been facing since long. Poor economy, unemployment and slow pace of the

development of this region is apparent here. Despite the major population dependent on the Agriculture, the arable land and its produce hardly suffice to sustain the populace round the year. The reason being that out of 53.59 lac hectare, only 6.65 is suitable for cultivation out of which only 2.24 lac hectare is irrigated land which is 33.74 percent of the total cultivated area. Rest 66% of agriculture depends upon rains. 2 The ratio of arable land is 17.6 per hectare. 3.

Moreover, the agriculture produce, being quality-wise less sustainable in the quality-conscious market, do not fetch the requisite price. The other reason for the poor economy of this region is lack of industries in this region. Save few assembling units, there is no Public/Private Sector Undertaking worth the same even. As a sequel to it, the mass employment prevails here which oblige the youth to go down the plains to seek employment. Apart other it is perhaps the most compelling factor which persuade the youth to join Army, however entry in the Armed Forces too, is not less competitive. Lack of industries, the basic infrastructure of the development of a region, has in fact slackened the required pace of growth of this region resulting into poor economy, unemployment and further enhanced the dependence of this region on others. It is because of these problems that the people of this region aspired to demand for a separate State so that the development of this region could be fully taken care of.

The immediate issue which agitated this issue was the reservation policy as declared by the then Govt. The people of this region, though supported the reservation policy of the State, however, they only wanted that the percentage of reservation earmarked for the OBC of this region should be determined in proportion to the OBC population as exists in this region. Since the OBCs make just 2% of the total population of this region, there appears no justification for 27% reservation.

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND : VIABILITY AND REPURCUSSION

There is no denying the fact that the declaration of grant of Statehood to Uttarakhand has once again set off a debate whether :

- 1) The smaller states will be economically viable.
- 2) Such states will undermine or strengthen the Indian Union.
- 3) Fulfillment of a demand for a new state will not agitate other such demands and the cleavage of the country will continue.
- 4) In reference to the Uttarakhand, the region should be granted the status of Union Territory in order to get itself prepared for Statehood.

VIABILITY :

The question which is being hotly debated is whether such a smaller state comprising of 9 hill districts would at all be a viable one. Theoretically the answer is "No". But at the same time, whether the states like J & K, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram too, are self-reliant one? The fact is that in view of the growing complexities of the administration, the thickly populated states are, by and large, becoming unmanageable. On the other, the smaller states like Punjab, Haryana, Himachal and Goa stand testimony to the fact that the smaller states, whose potential, is fully exploited, can stand up to the mark. It is true that 9 districts of Uttarakhand are landlocked, practically inaccessible for the industries, thus making the development of the region a herculean task however, potential of the following sectors viz; Agriculture, Horticulture, Canning and Fruit preservation, Animal Husbandry, Forestry, Irrigation, Power Generation, Industries, Mineral and Tourism, if fully exploited, may suffice to sustain the nascent state. At present the total income including revenue as shown in the table appended below, reveals the fact that the total income/revenue receipts from the Uttarakhand will suffice to sustain the new State.

INCOME FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES IN A YEAR :

Source	Income (in Crore)
1. Hydro-electricity	1252.00
2. Tourism	5.72
3. Forest Produce	80.00
4. Fruits & Vegetables	183.00
5. Agriculture	200.00
6. Minerals & Mining	13.23
7. Industries	33.76
8. Revenue	209.84
Total	1977.55

REPURCUSSION :

The movement for the separate state of Uttarakhand, by no stretch of imagination can be termed as a separatist / cessionist movement. The Socio-Economic compulsions have necessiated the creation of this new state. On the other, there is no denying the fact that conceding to the demand of the separate state of Uttarakhand would set off unending chain of the division of the other states ; Bihar for Jharkhand, Assam for Bodoland, Andhra for Telangana, Maharashtra for Vidarbha and so forth and so on. Such a cleavage of the country would definitely have telling effect on the unity and internal security of the country. Since such smaller states would for some time depend heavily upon the Centre for necessary financial assistance and care, the substantial chunk of its revenue would need to be targetrd to the sustenance of such states at the cost of other welfare schemes.

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UTTARAKHAND AT A GLANCE :

1. Geographic Location : 29.5" to 31.25" North Latitude and 77.45" to 81 East Longitude.
2. Adjacent States : Nepal and Tibet (China).
3. Total Area : 51125 Sq.Km. out of which 47325 Sq.Km. is hilly area. (Total area of Uttarakhand makes 18% of the total area of U.P.)
4. Population : 5926146 (as per 1991 census)
(4% of total population of U.P.)
Rural Population : 4640204 (72.88%)
5. Density : 116 per Sq.Km.
6. Sex Ratio : 1000:882
7. Literacy : 59.58% (Male literacy : 75.51%
Female literacy : 42.87%)
8. Caste Distribution : SC - 989658 (16.70%)
ST - 209838 (3.54%)
9. Forest Cover : 66%
10. Average Annual Rain : 1371 - 1629 mm.
11. Strategic Passes : Neeti, Mana, Thaga la, Jelukhaga Pass Marchila Moru La, Balchadhura, Kyugad, Kungribingri, Lampiya Dhura, Mangsa Dhura.



APROPOS OF CTBT

Lt. Gen. Ashok Joshi

PVSM, AVSM (Retd.)

In relation to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India is cutting a long furrow. We have been isolated, and it cannot be anybody's case that isolation in the international arena is a favourable development. The question that needs to be answered is if India could have explained its case better, more clearly, to better effect, and at least avoid the odium of false pretences.

India, in the past, has advanced a line of reasoning which aimed at disarmament as a prime means of avoiding armed conflict. As a starting point, CTBT had been proposed by India in 1954. It was, perhaps never intended that the matter should culminate or stop merely at the test ban, the ultimate goal being a total and complete disarmament. A simple stratagem adopted by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)-that of de-coupling the test ban and the disarmament - has placed India in awkward situation. India is being accused of opposing the test ban treaty after having sponsored the idea in the first place year after year. This is interpreted as a refusal to go along the path that leads to the goal only because the first stop on the way is not as far India would like it to be, and the time frame in which the ultimate goal is to be reached has not been thought of as yet. Although nobody deems to be directly refuting the ultimate goal, the US insistence on retaining the nuclear strategic deterrence for an undefined period does cast doubts about the US commitment. Indian stand in the matter is being interpreted not as understandable reservations about adverse consequences that would invariably follow for India, if the proposed treaty were to come into force, but as recalcitrance on the part of an underdeveloped nation wanting to argue for an equal status with the NWS. Even worse, there is some satisfaction that Indian 'preaching' in the past can be played back to it with some effect. We are being accused not only of being obstructionist but also hypocritical and devious. Indian stand, principled in our eyes, that the proposed CTBT is not comprehensive - it keeps alive certain possibilities which can only be exploited by the technologically advanced nation to perpetuate an iniquitous status quo that would, for ever, place India in a disadvantageous position with respect to NWS - and that it does not move forward even a single step in the direction of nuclear disarmament for want of a time bound commitment by the NWS is brushed aside as cavilling about minor details and thwarting major progress which could be of great benefit to the world at large.

It may be worthwhile at present to consider how and why India finds herself in this invidious position. India, rightly and understandably, is very

concerned about the implications of not only China being a nuclear power, but also its assistance to and collusion with Pakistan in the matter of developing the latter's nuclear capability - complete with delivery means. India certainly needs to keep its options open including the nuclear means. An indication of this awareness could be gleaned through the peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokharan in 1974. If India had not opted for nuclear armament, it certainly had decided not to lag behind technologically and thereby give up the option in default. Whether India itself-said it or not, the rest of the world acknowledged it as a potential nuclear power. How does this square with India's stand on complete and total disarmament? To us Indians, there appears to be no contradiction in our stand at all : we do want a peaceful world, and disarmament is one of the important measures in this direction. But in the mean-time, we cannot give up our security concerns. In short, we do have a hierarchy of interests, and universal concerns come below our national security, perhaps not for all the times to come, but in our present state of development. We do not like a situation in which we are asked to choose between prime national interests and those others which we also value. The second-best should not have to be the enemy of the best, but if we have to, we will make the difficult choice . Nuclear disarmament, is indeed a supra-national concern but it can hardly be progressed at the cost of national concern but it can hardly be progressed at the cost of national sovereignty or security concerns of some. Both concerns need to be reconciled. This agenda - reconciliation-can hardly be moved forward except through consensus. And consensus will be forthcoming not merely through clever arguments, although those will also help- but through tough bargaining for which purpose clear enunciation of self interests, and even more so, hierarchy amongst them is essential. The US do not feel apologetic about retaining their nuclear capability because of their national security concerns and say to unequivocally. Primacy of the nuclear option in the hierarchy of Indian interests is not minor matter. It needs to be clearly stated. American Civil War was fought over several things, but most of all about the primacy of the Union vis. a vis the rights of the constituent States. At a point of time to recognise and incompatible. If the USA had failed at the time to recognise and unequivocally state Union as the Prime interest, the confusion could only have made matters worse. Major commitments and decisions in matters such as these can only benefit from interests and their hierarchy. Temporising will not do. What is needed is not ambiguity, irrespective of whether it is by design or in default, but clarity that is born of deep thought and abiding concern. Such a course will promote a national debate and bring all the implications to the fore. Besides, India would also not appear to be talking in two voices.



INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY-RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Dr. K.S. Sidhu.

In continuation of its policy to oppose the nuclear monopolisation by some of the world's advanced powers, the Indian refusal to be a signatory to the CTBT has further intensified the doubts about its intentions in the nuclear field. The opinion being mobilized in favour of keeping the nuclear options open has foreign affairs and National Security scenario. Though it was evidently imminent on account of Indian non-committal attitude toward Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Yet it has been interpreted, by some powers, to be reflecting an adamant obstruction, by India, in the establishment of peace and security in an environment of complex relationship created by the uncertainty of the increasing tendency of nuclear proliferation.

It may be encountered by alleging that those powers have adopted anti-India stance towards its efforts to acquire the scientific know-how in the nuclear field, more so, after the 1974 nuclear implosion by India.

The powers interested in isolating India among the international community, on the nuclear issue, may use this opportunity to instigate India's adversaries, particularly Pakistan, of not only following Indian attitude but also encourage the latter, to adopt a policy of having or acquiring technology to produce nuclear weapons. These countries had already been Propagating that India's nuclear programme was aimed at "seeking time to build an atomic bomb" (1) before the effective implementation of CTBT or the NPT, as they apprehended that the Indian demonstration of their expertise in the nuclear weapons, has provided India with a very valuable data about manufacturing nuclear war-heads, weapons development and their subsequent production. (2) The terms and conditions forwarded by India to sign the NPT were considered to have raised doubts about whether the Indians are really serious, or whether they are merely laying the basis for a decision to go nuclear for ensuring a viable defence against the nuclear threat. The statement from Dr. Raja Ramanna, the main person who instrumented the Pokhran nuclear test on May 18, 1974 that India has to determine its philosophy of defence so that distinction may be made between the nuclear weapons for deterrence and for actual use. In case India needs only nuclear deterrence only a stockpile of first generation plutonium weapons will do and India is in a position to do so whereas in case India envisages being involved in a nuclear war, then it would need an arsenal of weapons, miniaturized to be used in battlefields. He assured that India's present nuclear capability is sufficient to act as a 'deterrence'. (3) In light of Indian attitude it should not sign the CTBT as it allows the selected few to maintain huge stockpile of nuclear weapons."

India's aims and objectives, and the nature of nuclear development

programme may be traced from the time of the first dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th of August 1945, soon after which Dr. H. J. Bhabha submitted a proposal to Sir Dorab Tata Trust for the setting-up of a "school of physics comparable to... the best anywhere" (4) with a view to enable India to train its experts in nuclear energy production.

On achieving independence India enacted the Indian Atomic Energy Act in April 1948 which led to the establishment of Atomic Energy Commission in the same year making India 8th country in the world to do so. (5) It was followed by the creation of a separate department of Atomic Energy in 1954 under the direct control of the then Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru.

Fearing a monopolised grip over the nuclear technology and production by the big powers, India decided to keep its options open having been convinced that it was "far more important to the underdeveloped countries of the world." (6) In pursuance of the policy to create a strong indigenous base for nuclear technology, India built its first light-water moderated swimming pool Type Reactor APSRA in 1956 with absolutely Indian know how except for the supply of enriched uranium from the Atomic Energy Authority of Great Britain exhibiting substantially to the developed states having advanced nuclear technology that "if need be" India can go ahead with her own programme based on natural uranium." (7) It paved the way for an offer of collaboration, initially from the Canadians, for the development of nuclear technology in India to match the international standards.

This development had a significant bearing on India's future plans regarding its nuclear programmes because such a step of India was a clear indication to those states which mattered that India "would even decide to go ahead with her programme if need be without any outside support" (8) It involves the basics of the international response to India's policy on nuclear development in future too.

Motivated by India's attitude towards arms control and disarmament and, as such, India's declared nuclear policy has been, apparently, based on its determination to use the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with a strong propaganda about its capability to use it for the production of nuclear weapons, if the need be, but at the same time declared unequivocally that it would not do so in the interest of the world peace and stability as is evident from the speech of the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, on January 30th, 1958, when he declared: "We have the technical know how for manufacturing the atom bomb. We can do it in three to four years if we divert sufficient resources in that direction. But we have given the world an assurance in that direction. But we have given the world an assurance that we shall do so." (9)

From furthering its demand for wider representation in the international

disarmament negotiations and commitment to banning of nuclear tests during 1950's, the Indian nuclear policy shifted to developing technical know how for peaceful purpose and keeping open its options for the use of nuclear energy for military purposes during 1970s. The 1980s witnessed India's efforts to find a delivery system of varied range in the form of Agni and Prithvi missiles. It has now reached the take-off stage waiting, perhaps, only for a political decision.

The problem of deciding about the nature of India's nuclear policy became more acute partly due to the American decision of expanding the jurisdiction and capability of its nuclear weapons beyond the minimum deterrent posture which tended to bring the whole Globe under the nuclear destructibility. Once such a decision was implemented by one big power, it was only a matter of time when the others followed suit. Soon India found itself surrounded by the nuclear weapons deployed in its close proximity in the former Soviet Union and China, beside the American nuclear armed forces being deployed permanently in the Indian Ocean. In such circumstances to ignore the nuclear factor in all its dimensions and look at it as only an Indo-Pak or Sino-Indian factor will be to continue to display the credulity and negligence about which were adequately visible after the Chinese aggression of 1962. (10) These developments supplemented by the historical events influenced by the nuclear power, the Indian nuclear policy should have been based more exactly on the needs of free India. The policy adopted promised not to use the nuclear energy for "evil purposes" (11) by not manufacturing nuclear weapons of any specifications "under no circumstances". (12) Such a policy in the changed conditions of the international geopolitical environment, appeared to be losing ground as the controversy as to whether India should go nuclear or not in terms of its use for war purpose has drastically altered the operational environment of the proposed nuclear policy, especially after the explosion of the Chinese nuclear bomb in October, 1964. There also appeared a volley of strong pressures for the reconsideration of India's nuclear policy suggesting even to the extent of reversing its "famous policy of non-alignment" so much so that even the personality like Dr. H.J.Bhabha, Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission categorically declared that "the only defence against such an attack" can be acquired through "a capability and threat of retaliation" (14) particularly when India was "in a position to make the bomb within 18 months of a political decision to do so." (15) Despite this, the best course the Indian nuclear policy could adopt was "to reserve the right to make the bomb should it become necessary in the interest of our country and survival." (16) It found the alternative of entering into a mad race for nuclear weapons as to be unproductive. As such instead of realising the need of adjusting its nuclear policy in accordance with the "dynamic changes" (17) taking place in the international geo-political, economic and military spheres, it preferred to a general assurance from

the major nuclear powers for "a defensive protection for the non-nuclear weapon states against a possible nuclear blackmail of attack." (18) The Indian decision for not going in for the production of the nuclear weapons was very categorically announced in the Indian parliament on February 17, 1965 that "we shall continue to strive for international understanding" (19) to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. The events preceding such a decision established, very aptly, the un-workability of such a proposition due to various reasons. But it has established on the one hand, India's firmness and sincerity for containing the nuclear proliferation to thenon-nuclear states and on the other hand has exposed the helplessness of the nuclear powers to work together for ensuring adequate security to the non-nuclear states, thereby establishing the Indian right to refuse the acceptance of the CTBT or the NPT in order to keep its options open. This situation was in pursuance of the events of the history of nuclear development by the five nuclear powers and the other clandestine nuclear powers, who have carried through their decision to go nuclear secretly in order to avoid any public debate on the issue. (20)

The major objective of India's declared nuclear policy has been to pull the Indian people out of their backward past and induct them into an age of modern living, not only in terms of their way of life but also in terms of their thought. To give practical shape to this objective, India concentrated on the establishment of laboratories and institutes for developing adequate indigenous nuclear scientific and technological know how rather than wasting its sources and energy for developing or acquiring nuclear weapon production capability as it was "determined not to be left behind" (21) in the use of this new source of power. The core of India's nuclear policy, therefore, was guided by three main considerations, i.e., "to master nuclear technology and utilize it for national economic development; to refrain from using it for other than peaceful purposes and; to work for total and complete disarmament; (22) leaving no ambiguity about its perceptions in the nuclear field. But the cracks appeared to have taken place in the confidence it had established among the international community regarding the objectives of its nuclear development programme during late 1960s and reached a climax in 1974 when India made its maiden nuclear explosion. The Indian efforts and explanations about the need of conducting such explosions as a part of the experiments for exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could not convince its critics and adversaries so much so that the Canadians stopped the supply of urgently needed spare parts for the Canadian co-operated Atomic Power Station and the Americans stopped the supply of fuel required for running the American assisted power station in India. The Indian nuclear explosion also "tended to substantiate the assessment of an inevitable Indian nuclear bomb behind

the country's practised nuclear policy." (23) However, India continued to pursue its nuclear policy irrespective of the international criticism of the Indian nuclear explosion to fulfil the Indian needs for immediate nuclear energy development primarily because the indigenous conventional energy resources available to India were not adequate enough to support the increasing industrialisation (24) and also because the exploitation of energy sources was "un-evenly distributed" which could make the nuclear power competitive in "certain areas of energy shortage, particularly the south and the west of the country". (25) Despite the existence of such a situation, it could not be possible to arrive at a viable conclusion about the options available to India with regard to the peaceful or non-peaceful development of its nuclear programme broadly steered by two main motives, that is, economic and military. Technically, out of these, if the former is implemented the latter can be easily acquired without much difficulty where as in the case of acquiring potential for the latter, it may not be that easy to conceive the former. However, in both the cases, the need of acquiring an independently manageable system based on the sophisticated technology and know how to achieve optimum production in the minimum possible time is of paramount importance. The Indian policy was clear at least so far as the overt decision for nuclear weapon production was concerned as its nuclear programme was more comprehensively general in purpose, nature and outlook so that it could simultaneously support the weapon and civilian production.

The prolonged public debate regarding the nuclear options, triggered off by the Chinese bomb, has adversely affected the Indian nuclear programme as it was motivated more by political rather than strategic or economic considerations. It became responsible for unnecessarily making the issue ambivalent and controversial beside disturbing the coherence and consistency of India's nuclear policy. It also blocked and restrained the possible help and support India could get from abroad unlike Pakistan which despite India's best efforts to internationalise the Pakistani nuclear development, may be credited with definite nuclear aspirations, could hardly lead to any debate on its nuclear options. It may also be pointed that the makers of India's nuclear policy could not properly and rationally conceive the threat to India's security before inspiring such an unhealthy public debate on so vital an issue nor could they formulate a logical or "comprehensive strategy" (26) to face a nuclear threat to India's security. To meet any threat from nuclear China or near-nuclear Pakistan the Indian policy continue to rely on the "general deterrence exercised by the big powers" rather than going itself nuclear or devising any "specific arrangements with either of the powers." (27)

The successful conclusion of the 1971-India-Pakistan War, in addition to improving the Indian morale also widened the scope of the Indian nuclear development and could think of the nuclear issue in the Global context. The

new perspective was expected to enhance India's status among the international community; add rapidity in the process of its relations with China; provide considerable independence to India from the big powers' pressure politics and thus force a change in their attitude towards India. A beginning in this context could be seen in the form of a nuclear explosion for peaceful purpose in 1974. The march of India's independence in the nuclear policy can, more appropriately, be traced from the late 1960s because there after a number of qualitative changes took place in the accordance with the geo-political considerations, both regional and global. The continuation of the policy is yet to be seen as the present incumbent is more involved in resolving the internal socio-political complexities of the State.

Rather than adopting a path of nuclear confrontation in a world bristling with more than 60,000 nuclear warheads, it would be relevant to urge upon the nuclear weapon powers to negotiate an international convention to exclude the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances because "no shield how so ever strong, would be impervious." (28) No doubt, the Indian nuclear policy has been guided more by the compulsions and political development in the international environment. For the maintenance of world peace and security. The significance and sensitiveness of any Treaty is to be assessed from Indian security point of view as has been rightly done in case of CTBT which India "cannot endorse or accept in its present form," (29) because India has to decide about the future of its nuclear policy after giving due consideration to all those factors which have bearing on it and also the fore-see-able outcome of a particular nuclear policy India has to very seriously view the attitude of the big powers and that of the regional powers. It has also to visualise as to whether its decision to go nuclear would lead to further proliferation of the nuclear weapons or would lead to the political destabilisation of the world order (30) where the arms race had been going on much before the production of nuclear weapon by any of the regional states. In such a situation, a self-reliant know-how in the nuclear technology without accepting discriminatory safeguards in the NPT, would be of paramount importance. Similarly, India has to review its future needs and the role it fore-see to play in the international peace and security, particularly its commitment to the strengthening of the Third World. To implement this objective, India has to give up the policy of Adhocism and take decisions on the basis of India's long-term commitments besides taking into consideration the merits and demerits of the specific issues and development. It has to take decisions to develop a long-term policy on firm basis because the uncertainty tends to invite greater amount of prolonged debates which can add to the confusion in the policy that India can ill-afford at this moment. Its policy should not be guided by what China or Pakistan are doing in the nuclear field but should be guided by the much wider

implications because neither China nor Pakistan can afford to go for the use of nuclear weapons without analysing its probable and potential consequences. Though the nuclear policy of India so far has withstood the test of time, yet it may not be treated as a policy desirable for a country of India's stature and potential. So far as the criticism and the pressures by the super powers against the Indian efforts to acquire self-sufficiency in the nuclear and the allied fields is concerned, India has to develop adequate resistance because the opposition merely on political grounds does not have any legitimacy from any code of law or ethics. India, therefore, has "every right to pursue the directions and sides it has" (31) to fulfil however, certain alterations and adjustments in view of India's overall national interests can not be ruled out. The steps taken should not be reversed unless necessitated by the un-avoidable circumstances. Even if India decides not to go for nuclear weapons it has to simultaneously develop its nuclear and space technologies besides accelerating research and development by training adequate number of scientists and technocrats and create greater facilities for research right from the lower level of education both in the private and the public sectors, so as to inculcate an aptitude for scientific and technological fields. A political decision to this effect based on a pragmatic approach has to be taken in this direction. So far as the extent of sophistication is concerned, India has already reached the take-off stage both in the nuclear and space technologies. It has now to consolidate its achievements and move cautiously but confidently towards the acquisition of these technologies and at the same time "struggle against the nuclear hegemony" (32) of some powers as there is "no illogic in struggling to bring about global nuclear disarmament". while, "exercising the nuclear option. The decision to go for nuclear weapons may not indicate aggressive intentions any more than having a standing army." (33) A nuclear India may prove to be more effective in negotiating arms control and disarmament. The Indian potential, on the other hand, may be meaningless if it does not exhibit that potential especially in light of the Sino-pak nuclear dimension supported by the American deployment of nuclear weapons may appear to be more hypothetical but the Indian prestige and security should not exhibit any sign of weakness of restraint. It has to take appropriate decision before the imposition of an automatic extension of the CTBT or NPT on indefinite basis, which swear the perpetual servitude of the nuclear weapon powers.

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SAARC, SAPTA AND POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTERGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA

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The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) finalised the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) at its Seventh Summit meeting in 1993 at Dhaka. SAPTA was the first step taken towards formalisation of economic cooperation in South Asia. It represented the political willingness on part of the South Asian leadership to proceed towards the economic integration of the region.

International economic integration has a rather short history. In the 1950s the term had come to mean a process of combination of separate economies in larger economic regions. Today the term has come to mean the formation of regional blocks. The general concept of economic integration is basically concerned with efficiency in resource use and economic gain. The political element in economic grouping is significant as most of these grouping are established for political reasons.

Stages

The creation of the SAPTA is the first stage of the process of formation of trade / economic blocs. The agreement is based on the principle of overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit all the SAARC countries, taking into account their respective levels of economic and industrial growth. It aims to promote and sustain mutual trade and economic cooperation. SAPTA is to include all products, manufactures and commodities in their raw, semi-processed forms.

The second stage in the development of trade arrangement is in agreement on free trade. It constitutes opening up of markets by not levying tariffs for interstate trade. The North American Free Trade Arrangement (NAFTA) of Canada, United States and Mexico is a case in point.

The third stage in this process represents a shift from decision making based on predominantly economic concerns to political compulsions. The process may begin with such politico-economic decisions like the creation of a customs union and then proceed towards the establishment of common political perspectives. The Benelux countries formed such union. The ASEAN refuses entry to countries of dissimilar political perspectives. The creation of monetary union is a further step in this direction. The Maastricht Treaty (1991) sought a political and monetary union including common foreign and security policies and a currency union. The European Community, despite its problems presents a model of a process of integration.

SAARC

SAARC had adopted the Nordic model of cooperation, where in the political sovereignty of cooperating states is not disturbed in the process of integration. SAARC sought to be a platform for establishment of cooperative relationship in South Asia. Given the political antagonisms in the region, SAARC adopted an incrementalist approach of keeping contentions politico-security issues outside the scope of SAARC and focus on economic, cultural, social and other areas.

The first summit meeting of Dhaka (1985) that established the organisation also confirmed the broad areas in which to consolidate cooperation. These included agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, health and population, transport, scientific and technological areas, postal services, sports, arts and culture. SAARC countries proceeded through a relatively encouraging progress through the Bangalore (1988), Kathmandu (1987), and Islamabad (1988) Summits. The Kathmandu Summit created the Regional Convention on suppression of Terrorism. This subject borders on the politico-security area. Yet it was well received by the member countries.

SAARC went through some uncertain years when the Colombo Summit had to be postponed due to the Sri Lankan reluctance to hold the Summit. The Sri Lankan attempt to involve a bilateral matter like the implementation of the India - Sri Lanka agreement and the subsequent despatch of the IPKF represented a setback to the spirit of SAARC. This uncertainty was reflected at the Male (1990) and the Colombo (1991) Summits. The postponement of the Dhaka Summit of 1992 by a year was caused by the spillover of disturbances in South Asia after the Ayodhya incident.

It is in the post cold war period that SAARC presents new perceptions and the understanding of the problems of cooperation. The Dhaka Summit reaffirms the need to liberalise trade as early as possible in a manner that would be mutually beneficial and in this context establishes the SAPTA.

Changes

The international scene has undergone momentous changes since the East European revolution and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Changes that have taken place in the concepts of power and ideology have a bearing on South Asian policies.

The cold war logic that the military was the ultimate source of power has given way to economic factors. The concept of power itself has now become relative in nature. There has also been a revival of the theories of interdependence. Joseph Nye writing on "Soft Power" or James Rosenau's work on "Turbulence in World Politics" are representatives of this change. Issues like slower growth rates, structural problems that confront some of

the competitive economic systems, mounting deficits etc. are emerging as dominant concerns today.

These changes have also transformed the traditional alliance patterns. At one level such regional organisations like European Community, ASEAN, NAFTA demand attention in a world that is shifting towards a spectre of trade wars. At another level nongovernmental organisations focussing on human issues like environment and ecology and human rights are taking the centre stages. The emerging new world order spells problem for the Third World in two issue areas : problems related to development and changing concerns of security.

The lack of financial resources and the need for new technologies constitutes the crux of developmental problems of the Third World. Developing countries cannot borrow from commercial sources and hence the need for foreign investment. The key infrastructural areas like power, transport, communication, banking and market facilities need, to be developed at a globally competitive level to attract foreign investment. In case of India the foreign direct investment in the core sector from August 1991 to July 1993 came to about 87% of the total investment. But on the other hand there is likely to be a significant decrease in the total quantum of aid available globally. It was calculated that between 1988 and 1990 of the total investment done globally. South and South East Asia received about 20% at an annual average. In the post 1990 period the claimants to investment have multiplied. The NAFTA may direct American aid to Mexico and Central and South America; East Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States have opened up for investment; South Africa in its post apartheid image is an attractive investment opportunity. The net result is likely to be a lesser quantum of money would be available for South Asia. Implicit in this is the need to be more competitive to attract this scarce aid.

The dramatics that involved the Indo-Russian deal on cryogenic engine purchase is an indicator of the curbs on new technologies that the developed world is likely to impose. India had a similar experience with the united States in the super computer deal. This is an age where almost all new technologies in the areas of electronics, Space, nuclear and materials sciences are likely to be classified as those of "dual use". The Third world developing countries are likely to face stiff opposition due to the perceived threats of proliferation of technologies and their possible ill uses.

In the area of security concerns, internal security has emerged as one of the key threats to security in the developing world. In South Asia, for example, problems labeled as insurgency, low intensity conflicts and terrorism are far more serious than the possibilities of a border war. These problems draw their roots in Socio-cultural, economic and political causes that are usually located with one's political system .consequently, the primary responsibility for these problems remains one's own. Regional

conflicts would only aggravate these problems and in the long run be mutually harmful to both the conflicting parties.

Prospects

It is these dilemmas of the problems of development and security in the post cold war period that needs to be the focus of the SAARC debate in the years to come. The rationale for cooperation in SAARC had been the use of incrementalism as an approach. SAARC had avoided contentious issues to ensure that a dialogue is begun between the states of the region. Except the foray into cooperation for tackling terrorism SAARC had avoided politico-security issues. The Dhaka Summit of 1993 is significant because it represents the first deliberate effort on part of the leadership in South Asia to chart out a definite path of the leadership in South Asia to chart out a definite path of action that is both, a requirement of the times and present a logical direction for cooperation. SAPTA cannot remain an adhoc effort to tackle the oncoming global economic crisis. It has to be the first step towards the eventual integration of South Asia at the economic and subsequently, political level. The debate may be on the time schedule of this process, it cannot be on content of the issue.

Economic integration in Europe has come to be linked with growth of post-materialism in European society. The relative economic stability and the low rate of inflation have had positive effects on the push towards integration. The logic of post-materialism may not be applicable to South Asia. The rationale for economic integration may have to be searched in consequent economic gains. These may, at minimum ensure the survival of the nation state system and at a maximum grant benefits of economics of scale.

The APEC sumit Bogor (1994) has succeeded in agreeing on a time table to introduce free trade in the region. APEC does not plan to use the European or the North American approach. Instead it plans to make it easier for companies to use the region as an operating base.

The forthcoming summit therefore would have to pursue this path of integration further. There are two issues that would demand attention in the coming years : the concern about territorial democracy and the conceptual validity of the SAARC Parliament. The international dimension of territorial democracy focuses on the democratisation of approach to inter state relations. India would have to ensure that in the SAARC format India does not emerge as a hegemonic power but a power that accommodates legitimate concerns of the participative states (in a democratic norm-pattern). At another level the applicability of this concept can be seen in the eventual formation of a SAARC Parliament. Such Parliament can use the methodologies of conflict resolution through

legislatures and effectively implement the territorial democracy approach. The global countdown for the formation of trade blocs has started. The Maastricht Treaty started the process in Europe. NAFTA, created in 1993 has the target date for free trade set for 2009. Its first phase has already started in 1994. Other American groupings like Mercosur and Andean Pact have targeted 1995 for free trade. The APEC has set the date as 2020. It is for SAARC to hasten the process of SAPTA to achieve greater economic cooperation and formulate timetables that can be adhered to.

In the longrun the countries of South Asia would have to search for these common concerns to forge a common approach to the process of modernisation and development. There is an inevitability in cooperation for the alternatives threaten the very survival of the



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